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Accident reports are typically divided into chapters which reect the dierent per
spectives of various specialists It is sometimes the case that these alternative view
points lead to inconsistencies and omissions where an incident covered at length by
one specialist may be ignored by another This creates a problem in that the con
clusions of the report may thus be muddled or incomplete and consequently lead to
further errors of comprehension amongst those who need to understand the ndings
Similarly several dierent reports of the same accident may be produced This cre
ates problems for the companies and regulators which must act on the ndings of
these inconsistent accounts It is therefore desirable to have a rigorous method for
checking consistency between dierent chapters and accounts
We present the novel application of the idea of crossviewpoint consistency typi
cally used in software engineering to unify dierent accident perspectives Further
more we propose a method of consistency checking that should ensure a new more
detailed view of the overall accident is produced This will encompass two or more
dierent viewpoints In doing so we show for the rst time how crossviewpoint
consistency checking may be achieved for accident analysis It is hypothesised that
this will help to resolve the inconsistencies that frequently arise between dierent
accounts of the same accident
Keywords  Accident analysis Temporal Logic of Actions Crossviewpoint consistency
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 Introduction
Accident reports are typically separated into sections or chapters which each focus upon
distinct aspects of the accident This separation can lead to dierence in emphasis What
is seen as important within one part of the accident can be disregarded in another For
example in the report on the Piper Alpha oil rig explosion  dierent chapters deal
with respectively the way that the disaster developed after the initial explosion and the
operation of the permit to work system which operated on the rig Dierent viewpoints
can thus lead to incomplete or vague conclusions or at the other extreme ndings which
focus upon a specic aspect of the accident which would only be germane to that particular
scenario so being of little use in future accident prevention The accident inquiry and
reporting process is thus seriously weakened
This problem with separate perspectives is exacerbated when there is more than one
report upon an accident as was the case with the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in
March  There were three major reports into that accident one by the US Nuclear
Regulatory Commission  one by the US Presidents special inquiry and one by the
plant operators  Furthermore media articles technical specications and legislation
are constructed from these reports which may perpetuate or indeed amplify inconsis
tencies within the original documents Indeed there exists a bibliography of the pieces
written about the Three Mile Island accident which itself extends to more than four hun
dred pages  This copious amount of reporting therefore makes the Three Mile Island
incident a valuable example for this paper The crossviewpoint consistency techniques
we shall describe have been proven in the area of software engineering especially in the
building of operationally correct distributed and concurrent systems We argue that they
are of direct relevance to accident analysis in that disaster scenarios may be viewed as
complex concurrent systems Moreover specialists which investigate accidents from dif
ferent perspectives are similar to requirements engineers who specify dierent components
of a distributed software system
As an example of crossviewpoint consistency checking we shall take two accounts one
by Bignell and Fortune 	 and the other by Fremlin  We shall attempt to investigate
them formally using Lamports Temporal Logic of Actions TLA  and we will develop
a methodology for crossviewpoint consistency checking for accident analysis using TLA
We shall use TLA to develop a unifying formalisation from two existing reports This
idea is illustrated in Figure  We believe that this is a novel application of the idea of
crossviewpoint consistency
   The Three Mile Island Accident Overview
The incident which took place in the number two reactor of the Three Mile Island nuclear
plant in Pennsylvania started on 
th March  An error during maintenance led to
valves switching o and whilst most of the corrective measures worked properly one relief
valve remained open and allowed too much water to ow out from the primary water
circuit which conducted heat away from the reactor core This meant that a loss of coolant

ACCIDENT




Figure   Diagram of dierent viewpoints of an accident and how a unifying account may
resolve dierent reports
accident LOCA occurred which led to a signicant discharge of radioactive material into
the atmosphere and almost caused a catastrophic explosion at the plant
  Structure of the paper
In Section  we describe the basic structure of the Temporal Logic of Actions and how
it may be used to formalise accident reports We describe the various components of the
formalism and how they may be related to parts of an accident scenario We show how
variables may be hidden within a specication of a scenario and how this can be used
for further renements
This aspect of TLA is vital for the crossviewpoint consistency checking which is de
tailed in Section 	 Prior to this in Section  we present formalisations within TLA of two
separate accounts of the Three Mile Island disaster The Section on crossviewpoint con
sistency checking 	 as well as providing the theoretical basis for providing a unication
shows how the two example accounts may be resolved within one rening specication
We present our conclusions and avenues for future work in Section 

 Using TLA in Accident Analysis
We need a common formal framework for the two reports in order to develop a unifying
formal specication which will be used to establish crossviewpoint consistency The for
malisation of each account thus allows the internal consistency of each informal account
to be checked and enables discrepancies to be deduced We shall use the temporal logic of
actions as the medium for our formalisation TLA is an elaboration by Lamport of simple
temporal logic   where the elementary formulas of the logic are based upon actions
Actions are boolean valued expressions involving variables their primed equivalents where
x
 
denotes the new value of x in an updated state and simple values and constants  
always  in all states and  eventually  in some state More specically the
basic formulas of TLA are either predicates actions involving no primed variables or of
the form  A
f
 this notation is explained in Section  below
  Fundamentals of TLA for accident analysis
The formalisations of the accounts are up to the point where the LOCA had started
We dene the LOCA to be the point where water ow stopped in the primary circuit
surrounding the reactor core In our formalisation we wish to establish an eventuality
property  namely that given the basic operating conditions of the nuclear plant the
catastrophic conditions that were enabled on 
th March  eventually led to an LOCA
event At the top level therefore we wish to establish that
Opconds  EnabledCat LOCA
In the above
Opconds represents the operating conditions existing at the TMI plant prior to and during
the accident
Cat represents the set of catastrophic conditions
LOCA is the Loss of Coolant Accident event
The Enabled predicate is explained in Section 
  is the temporal leads to operator 
A B means that B is sometime in the future a consequence of A We discuss this and
the semantics of causality further in Section  below This can be shown to be equivalent
to 
Opconds EnabledCat LOCA
If we cannot prove the above assertion then we may deduce that either Opconds or Cat
is wrong That is either our model for the operating conditions of the plant or the set of
catastrophic actions which led to the accident is incomplete in some respect This does
provide useful information for accident analysts since it should be possible for analysts to
pinpoint the places where the proof fails and consequently the missing components in

the formal model of the accident This reasoning can therefore be used to identify gaps
in the original informal account
We formulate theOpconds in a similar way to that which Lamport presents for a general
formalisation of a concurrent program That is Opconds is dened as follows 
Opconds





 Init represents the initial conditions of the operation of the plant
 N is an action which represents the nextstate relation of the operation of the plant
 F is the fairness condition
 f is a state function comprising a tuple of all the variables included in the formali
sation
This model provides a common framework for expressing the workings of a system eg
a nuclear power plant a North Sea oil rig etc at which an accident took place We
circumscribe the state of components at the start of the scenario by Init which clearly
species what was thought to be occurring before the accident started The nextstate re
lation N  describes actual events as they occur within an accident situation This includes
actions that need not have disastrous consequences ie actions which would comprise part
of normal operations such as the water turning to steam to drive the turbine in a power
station The fairness condition F  gives equal weight to each subaction comprising the
entire model  this means that we ensure that the system is live in that an innite series of
stuttering steps does not occur In our model we do not want to didactically stipulate that
each action must occur simultaneously or in a preordained sequence The allowance for
stuttering steps means that components of the accident may remain unaltered for several
states in the execution of the model but the fairness condition ensures that the components
will eventually change their values if it ever becomes possible for them to do so
 The Initial conditions Init
Init represents the operating conditions of the plant prior to the occurrence of the acci
dent For example this will specify that the relief valve to the primary circuit was ini
tially closed relief valve  closed and that water ow in the primary circuit was normal
primary ow  normal When establishing crossviewpoint consistency it will be neces
sary to establish that the initial conditions for a unifying formalisation may be considered
a renement of each Init formula
	
 The Nextstate relation N
N represents the relationship of variables between states within a discrete time model of
the nuclear plant operation For example we could give the temperature of the water in
the primary circuit as it relates to the temperature of the water in the secondary circuit
f is a state function consisting of simply a tuple of all the variables used in the model 
this allows us to specify stuttering steps where the values of the variables do not change
Allowing these stuttering steps is essential to enable renement of the model at a later
stage  see Section 
	 of  Briey the stuttering steps mean that certain variables will
not be altered in some states A renement of the model can then be made by introducing
new variables which would not exist and therefore would not alter in the original If
stuttering was not allowed then we could not say that the new model was a renement of






 N  f
 
 f
This states that the action N may occur or that all the variables included within f will
be unchanged N is the disjunction of all the operating actions R together with the
catastrophic actions Cat Some of the actions of R will only be enabled once some of the
actions comprising Cat are enabled
 The Fairness condition F
It may seem strange at rst to include a fairness condition F  for the operation of the
nuclear power plant However it is through F that we formalise the notion that the plant
either runs as planned or it fails  fairness conditions such as F allow eventuality properties
such as the one above to be established We simplify the fairness condition of the nuclear
power plant operation to state that always either the actions of the plant must occur or
eventually they become always impossible This is a strong fairness condition see 








Again f refers to the tuple of variables in our model of TMI The angle brackets hi




 A  f
 
 f
This is useful where we wish to stipulate the fact that stuttering steps are not occurring and
that some alteration to components is denitely taking place within an accident model It
is from these notions that we obtain liveness within the system and this allows eventuality
properties of the form A B to be deduced










Indeed we have strong fairness conditions covering both the ordinary actions of the
plant which we denote C and the catastrophic actions This ensures that both the catas
trophic actions and the operating actions must occur in the model of the event
 State functions
In the above the state functions used to subscript actions are simply tuples of all the vari
ables in the specication Generally however state functions consist of any mathematical
function upon the variables of the system ie the variables eg x are the inputs to the
function and their primed versions eg x
 
 are the outputs
The Enabled Predicate The Enabled predicate is true for an action A and a state s if
and only if it is possible to take an A step starting in that state That is to say that there
exists some other state which is related to s by the action A
The Unchanged Predicate Most of the actions will only change the values of a few of
the many component variables of the accident formalisation We explicitly denote which
variables are left unchanged since as Lamport cogently argues the mathematical validity
of the formalisation will be compromised if it is only done implicitly This is especially
pertinent for accident analysis where we are expressly trying to avoid any description by
implication where it is assumed that the reader will be able to ll in missing details 
for example in Fremlins account it is mentioned that the emeregency corecooling system
started and began to raise the coolant level Implicit in this statement is the fact that
the primary circuit water level must have been signicantly lowered by the opening of a
valve to the quench tank The discipline of making every action explicit via Unchanged
in our formalisation allows us to avoid such pitfalls which are provided by informal or




 f  f
 
We also allow the same predicate to range over sets This is merely treating tuples as sets
and vice versa The convenience of using sets is that it allows us to specify conveniently
that all variables in the system Var are unchanged apart from one or two For example
we express the fact that everything remains unaltered apart from the aircircuit valves 
Unchanged Varnfac valvesg
Hiding variables and re	nement In some cases in accident analysis the formalisa
tion will include components whose details are inessential to the system as a whole For
example in the account by Bignell and Fortune 	 no mention is made of the state of the
demineralizer at the plant Therefore as a component variable of the formalised system
it may be hidden via an existential quantication thus 
	 demineralizer  Opconds

where throughout Opconds the demineralizer variable remains unchanged
This idea is particularly useful for unifying two separate accounts of an accident where
a component which occurs in one is not mentioned or is unimportant in another The
semantics of this existential quantication over hidden variables is given in  Section

We can replace hidden variables h say as necessary by state functions h which are
dened in terms of other variables or constants in the system This enables us to rene
formal accident specications by replacing hidden variables with their rening functions
For example in the above we could substitute a function demineralizer for the hidden
variable demineralizer in Opconds to produce a rened version of the specication denoted
Opconds
	 Types in TLA and Accident Analysis
Lamport rejects the notion of explicitly typing the variables of the system arguing 
Section 
 that they can be derived as properties of the program We do not take this
view since we believe that typing forms an important part of the documentation of the
formalisation particularly for accident analysis The typing of a component of the accident
instantly tells us the range of values that may be taken by that component and perhaps
more crucially the operations that can be performed on that component Our development
of accident analysis encourages a form of strong typing whereby the operations upon each
component are quite narrowly prescriptive For example the action of lowering the control
rods into the reactor core should not increase the temperature of the primary circuit
coolant if other factors are constant Therefore we may assert the type of this operation
which we call lower as follows
lower   
t   TempPress control rods  up  water temp  t
 control rods
 
 down  water temp  t
Unchanged Varnfcontrol rodswater tempg
This restricts the values of the primary circuit water to be less than or equal to the tem
perature before the lowering operation lower is a state function and the type reects the
preconditions of its operation by predicates involving unprimed variables whilst predicates
using primed variables form its postconditions NB We are not stating the above as a
physical law  indeed there may be circumstances in which the lowering of the control rods
produces an increase in primary circuit temperature However all operations performed
in the plant have a certain specication and should delimit the way that components may
be altered Typing reects such specications if the typing is incorrect then a deciency
in the basic model of the operation of the plant has been discovered Typing does as
Lamport says reect properties which could be established after the formal model has
been created We use typing to ensure that properties which have been implicitly assumed
about the plants operation are stated explicitly at the onset This may be contrasted
with the causal event formulas of Section  which represent properties of the dynamic

sequence of events described in the accident reports These formulas have to be proven as
opposed to types which are axiomatic assertions

 Causality
In accident analysis we typically make extensive use of the leads to logical connective




This has the intuitive interpretation that it is always the case that if A is true then B
will eventually be true This thus enables us to represent causality in accident accounts
formally
However the above only represents a form of weak causality where B may become true
even when A is always false This will be the case when B is inevitable ie that  B
holds We may occasionally require a stronger form of causality where some formula B
representing some eect only occurs due to some cause A This is particularly the case
where we wish to axiomatise the underlying assumptions about the interactive behaviour
of components of the plant where we wish to stipulate that one action must or must not
be the consequence of another We represent this by the following denition 
De	nition  
Strong causality We say that A is the cause of B if and only if A leads




 A B  A B
This stronger notion of causality will be useful when establishing crossviewpoint consis
tency relative to a set of axioms about each of the components of the plant For instance
we might wish to stipulate that opening the relief valve RVO to the primary water circuit
would cause water to runo WRO 
EnabledRVO  EnabledWRO
Similarly we wish to stipulate that opening the relief valve does not cause the control rods
in the reactor core to be lowered CRD 
EnabledRVO  EnabledCRD
 Formalisation of accounts of the disaster
In this section we give the formalisation of two accounts of the Three Mile Island Accident
We have already formalised an account by Bignell and Fortune 	 in 	 The details
of the formalisation of Bignell and Fortunes report is supplied in the Appendix to this
report We thus concentrate on describing the formalisation of the account by Fremlin of




  Fremlins account of the accident
The report given by Fremlin of the Three Mile Island nuclear accident is given in  pages

	 Fremlins account is itself a distillation of a piece that appeared in Nuclear News
of th April 
 Causal events in Fremlin
s account
Here we formalise the temporal behavioural properties which are described in Fremlins
account We present a series of causal event predicates which attempt to model the
chain of events being described and give the quotes used to arrive at the formulas given
It should be expected that a formalisation at the system level where we describe changes
in variables representing components of the accident scenario will allow us to prove the
toplevel properties listed below It should be noted that the operating conditions of the
plant Opconds forms a premise to each of the formulas below ie without Opconds holding
the formulas below will not necessarily be valid We present here a sample of the causal
event formulas The informal denition of all the individual actions is given in Table  and
the full list of causal event actions is given in Tables  which are in the Appendix
 EnabledDMF  EnabledASV EnabledMFS
The above is derived from the following on page  of  
At about 	AM the main feedwater system malfunctioned apparently as
a result of failure either of the demineraliser or of the air supply to an
airoperated valve
Note that we do not specify realtime constraints such as 	AM in our formalisation
This is discussed in the section on future work in this area
 EnabledMFS  EnabledAFE EnabledAFS
This resulted from the quote  page 	 below 
With the main feedwater supply system out of operation the auxiliary
system was to have started automatically It did not however because a
number of manual valves in the auxiliary system had inadvertently been
left closed after a test of the system in the days prior to the accident
 EnabledPLH  EnabledECS EnabledECO
We derive this from a quote  page 	 
Accordingly an operator manually overrode rst one of the two emergency
corecooling water injection pumps and in a few minutes the other be
lieving that already too much water had been fed in

Action Description
AFE This denotes the auxiliary feedwater system being enabled
AFS The action of the auxiliary feedwater system starting
ASV The airsupply to an airoperated valve
CRS The shutting down of the chain reaction
CTS The continued transmission of heat from the core to the primary circuit
after shutdown
CWR Refers to the continuous runo of water into the quench tank
DMF The failure of the demineraliser
ECS The operation of the emergency corecooling system
MFS The correct operation of the main feedwater system
PIF The fault in the pressure level indicator
PLH The indication of highpressure in the primary circuit
RVF Indicates that the relief valve was faulty
RVO The relief valve opening
SGD The steam generators drying out
Table   Actions and their informal descriptions for the Fremlin account

Note that we are treating the operators as automatons and are not considering the
range of options at their disposal we mention in the conclusion how belief systems
may be formalised by epistemic logics and we discuss how they may be integrated
within our TLA framework This will allow epistemic considerations also to be
checked for crossviewpoint consistency between reports
 EnabledECS  PPL LOCA
This says that an LOCA occurred as a result of the emergency cooling being shut
o by the operators and the pressure being low PPL We dene the LOCA as
consisting of zero water level and pressure The above formula is derived from the
following quote  page 	 
Within two minutes of the emergency cooling shuto it appears that at
the reduced pressure water in the pressure vessel began to boil into steam
lowering the waterlevel
This is as far as we take the formalisation ie the formal model which we develop
should merely be sucient to show that the LOCA eventually takes place after other
actions have taken place
It should be stressed that these causal events are properties which should be provable
from the actual systemlevel modelling of the accident These properties represent the
descriptive ow of events in an accident report It is necessary to show that the formal
isation of such a report will lead to a consistent and complete set of provable temporal
formulas If this is not so then we have consequently detected inconsistencies or omissions
in the report Types on the other hand indicate information about the plant which is
independent of the actual accident scenario They indicate how each component of the
scenario should behave They indicate static properties of the system as opposed to the
dynamic properties indicated by the causal event formulas It is possible to deduce aws in
the typing of components and operations that will indicate errors in the assumptions about
the basic operation in the plant rather than inconsistencies in the reporting mechanism
 System modelling of the accident
Having given the toplevel behaviours that we expect to be able to prove we now give
a formal specication of the accident as a concurrent computational system We aim to
eliminate any explicit idea of sequence in the formalisation If this was desired then it could
be done by introducing a variable which indicated the stage reached during the accident
This is the approach adopted by Lamport when formalising a sequence of commands in an
imperative programming language The point of not having an explicit idea of sequence
is that we do not restrict the model to having a timeow which is implicit in a given
accident report  only some relative timings or sequences may be fully described whilst
the reader is left to infer others Instead sequences of actions the causal event formulas











Table   Types of the formalisations
will be enabled only once certain other actions have taken place The causal leads to
relations given above can thus be derived as a result of this logic rather than due to
an explicit sequencing There is a particular point in making the sequencing implicit
rather than explicit  it allows greater freedom in producing a formal specication which
corresponds to the accident report and consequently enables crossviewpoint consistency
between reports to be established more easily If we had an explicit sequencing variable
then it may be impossible to unify two equivalent reports We are therefore assuming that
in general the sequence of events is nondeterministic whilst the types of components and
the operations upon components are completely stated and are xed by the model This is
reasonable since the types and operations represent the knowledge and assumptions about
the accident scenario at the time of its occurrence whilst the sequencing of events is a
dynamic product of the accident itself
Types We use the types listed in Table  apart from Bool Although these are clearly
isomorphic to Bool and other nite types we give them separate identiers in order to aid
interpretation of the formalisation of the accident account We assume that there is some
natural ordering on each of these nite types so that a water temperature of low is less
than high We overload the comparison operators         so that they are used
for each such ordering In addition it makes a restriction upon operations over certain
components and as such may compared with Dearden and Harrisons method of specifying





air circuit status AirDuct
relief valve status ValveStat
primary ow TempPress
Table   Variables common to both formalisations
Common variables used in both formalisations Table  shows the variables that
both the Fremlin and Bignell  Fortune formalisations have in common
Components Certain variables are unique to Fremlins account and are shown in Ta
ble 	
The Init action Here we stipulate the values of the component variables of the plant at
the start of the accident in Fremlins account This consists of the conjunction of all the
initial values before the accident started Obviously establishing Init for a given accident
formalisation is a matter of gleaning information both from the accident report itself and




 water runo  false  primary ow  normal
water press  normal      
The Nextstate action This comprises the operation of the plant together with the
actions which occurred during the accident It should be noted that such actions are not
automatically enabled  some of them will only occur if the Cat actions see below occur
The actions can be partitioned into two the disjunction of which will form N  The rst
action R is simply the disjunction to denote nondeterministic concurrency of actions
within the accident system of all the actions listed in Tables   given in the Appendix






 AFE  AFS  CRS
CTS  CWR  ECS
MFS  PLH  RVO  SGD

Variable Type
air supply status WorkStatus







pressure indicator status WorkStatus
Table 	  Variables of the Fremlin formalisation
Note that we have included some predicates in the above which do not actually indicate
a change between states but merely an assertion about one particular state It is not
always essential to include such predicates  the LOCA predicate should become true as
a result of other actions for instance  but again it does provide a complete reference for
the accident analyst and a direct comparison with the original report
The Catastrophic actions Cat which denotes the catastrophic events which took place
in the accident scenario and which triggered the events leading to LOCA consists of a
conjunctive normal form made out of the contributory causes to the accident Therefore




 ASV DMF  PIF  RVF
The Fairness condition The fairness condition gives equal weight to each action in
the formal specication of the accident including the catastrophic actions There is thus a
strong fairness condition for each action both those in N and in Cat listed in Tables 
so as to give each one the same opportunity to occur
	
 Viewpoint Consistency Checking
Crossviewpoint consistency checking for accident analysis comprises the following steps 
 Consistency checking of each account
 Development of a unifying formal specication
 Internal consistency checking of the unifying account
  Consistency checking of each account
The basic point of the formalisation of accident reports is to ensure that inconsistencies
and omissions are avoided which may occur with natural language reports To ensure that
each account is internally relatively complete ie all theorems about the accident scenario
are provable with respect to the assumptions made about the disaster we must show that 
 Each of the causal event formulae see  above is provable given the assumption
that Opconds and EnabledCat are valid premises That is for each formula C
OpcondsEnabledCat j C
 The overall accident analysis predicate
Opconds EnabledCat LOCA
is valid
We have shown how such formulae may be proved for Bignell and Fortunes account in
	 Such formulae are known as eventuality properties and are a form of liveness except
here in accident analysis we are showing that something bad does happen as a result
of certain catastrophic predicates being true In general such formulae are proved by
























A  F  SF
g
M
In our proof in 	 we use a simpler version SF of the above rule which is given in 





being P with primed variables substituted for unprimed ones Also f and g are
state functions The barring eg M refers to a substitution of state functions for any
hidden variables present in the formula As already mentioned this consistency checking


for each individual account is discussed fully in 	 We shall assume that the two accounts
have been shown to be internally relatively complete
Naturally we shall also be concerned that the accounts are internally relatively sound  
that is for any formula F  which is provable then F can be shown to be valid To do
this we require some logical model of the statements which are derivable for an accident
scenario In particular we need to provide a set of axioms  for each component of
the accident which will thus restrict the formulas that can be classed as valid This idea
is discussed further below in the piece on internal consistency checking for the unifying
specication We shall assume that each of our formalised accounts has been shown to be
internally relatively sound
 Development of a unifying specication
Having shown each account is internally consistent we need to produce some unication of
the two accounts We do this by showing the following holds 




of an accident then we can say that they are








 dev S S
 
  dev S S

   
L
S




as given by the dev pred
icate which is internally valid  
L
S with respect to the formal description technique
L  in this case TLA
This approach to crossviewpoint consistency has been proposed in  Other ap
proaches to crossviewpoint consistency checking have included 
 Provide a semantics for the FDT use in an appropriate logic and then perform consis
tency checking in that logic Consistency can be shown if there are no contradictions
in the logical representations of the specications See  
 The Viewpoint Oriented Software Engineering VOSE approach denes a set of
relations that should hold between viewpoints Consistency checking then involves
showing that these relations do hold However completeness is not guaranteed and
the best that can be established in general is partial completeness This approach is
again described in 
We believe that the approach of  is most appropriate approach for accident analysis
since it explicitly constructs a new specication from the two already given Thus a new
unifying account is produced which includes issues raised in both reports
 A general methodology for accident analysis
We prescribe the following methodology for formalising the ideas of crossviewpoint con












 Need to identify those variables which occur only in one specication but not in the
other These will correspond to processes or objects which are mentioned in one
account but not in the other Let VarS denote the set of variables declared for a
specication S






which are versions of the originals with











The quantication is over all variables which occur in S

but not in S
 
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where if A is of the form
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is some state function Note that we should be careful to make a
distinction between parts of S which add nondeterminism uncertainty relative to
one of the original specications and those which are genuine renements of both
formalised accident scenarios For instance if one account says that the cause of
some event was due to action A whilst another ascribes it to either A or B then we
have no choice in our unifying model but to use the latter However the resulting
account is less precise than the rst one
	 Check for internal consistency within S This is done by showing that a predicate
 
TLA




We not only have to exhibit the unifying accident specication S but we have to ensure
that S is internally consistent This will mean that S reects only possible realworld
behaviour and not nonsensical scenarios where for example water pumps are switched o
but the water level continues to rise steadily
Consistency checks for viewpoints in software engineering consist of showing that the
specication is implementable For some FDTs such as LOTOS this check is trivial since
the specications are guaranteed to be in some sense executable For others such as Z
and TLA it is possible to write formulae down which are impossible to realize
We introduce the idea of accident scenario realisability Firstly we develop a set of
axioms  in TLA which constrains the possible behaviours of the components of the plant
so that for example a pump cannot be simultaneously both on and o These axioms
should reect the specication of the plants operations as laid down in regulatory and
technical documents So for example included within the axioms will be a formalisation
of the assumption that the walls of the containment building surrounding the reactor will
have a certain thickness of concrete Moreover it limits the possible interactions between
components so that the act of switching the highpressure pumps o did not simultaneously
lead to the control rods being removed from the core This restriction will typically use the
negation of causal formulas and the Unchanged predicate so that operations are restricted
in scope  this is a variant of the idea of strong typing for accident components that was





to denote the axioms which are internal to the components and those covering interactions
between components respectively The point of this partition is to try to resolve any
consistency failures It is necessary to show that each axiom comprising  will be shown
to hold for the specication S We suggest that if a failure occurs for an axiom within 
c
then this simply suggests that realisability has failed and that it is not possible to unify the
two accounts of the accident or that an error has occurred in the specication process A
failure to establish a 
i
formula however may be more revealing It is possible in this case
that we may expose the fact that one of the underlying assumptions about the interactions
within the system is false In other words if a 
i
formula does not hold then we may have
discovered some faulty reasoning that led to the accident occurring originally






which denote which formulae are not satised
by S If these sets are nonempty then we can develop an internally valid account by
modifying S and!or removing axioms from  As we have noted above this latter option
reveals assumptions about the accident scenario which have been shown to be invalid
 Development of the axiom set 
It is extremely important to realise that in general the set  results from the assumptions
made by the analyst of the two viewpoints possibly based on data provided by other
specialists For example our expectation that switching o the high pressure pumps would
not result in the control rods being raised would be based upon the specication of the


plant given by the nuclear engineers Therefore we are realising the accident reports with
respect to this background information which comprises  Normally however  is not
included within the two viewpoints We denote the assertion of consistency by  
TLA
S
which means that S is shown to be internally consistent relative to the set  in TLA We
shall omit the TLA subscript since we are only using the one specication language and
frequently we shall miss out  from the predicate where the context makes it obvious







 the set of axioms which are preserved by S should be included as part of the
resulting formal specication of the accident S
 
 so as to make explicit the background

















 should also be explicitly mentioned
 Consistency checking for our example
We now proceed to check the crossviewpoint consistency of the formalisations of the two
reports given in 	 and  The former we shall denote as S
B
and the latter as S
F

 Consistency checking of Accounts
We shall assume that each account has been shown to be internally relatively both sound
and complete A demonstration of how completeness may be established is given in 	
 Development of a unifying speci	cation
We shall now outline how a unifying specication which theoretically may be interpreted
as a unifying natural language account may be derived from the two reports
Identifying common variables We have identied those variables which are common
to both accounts in Table  Those which are unique to Fremlins account are given in
Table 	 which we shall denote Var
F
 and those which are unique to the Bignell and
Fortune account are given in Table 
 which we shall denote Var
B










and viceversa for S
B
 Bounded by the existential quantication will be variables such
as steam turbine which occur in the Bignell and Fortune account but not in the Fremlin
account Of course these variables need to be added to the main formulas such as S
F
 as










  Variables of the Bignell and Fortune formalisation
Unifying speci	cation development As a rst step we can coalesce dierent vari
ables from the two accounts which perform identical functions and are of equivalent types
For instance we can establish that control rods present only in the Bignell and Fortune
account and core reaction correspond to one another Thus for S
h
F
we can produce a state
function control rods where
control rods

 if core reaction  o
then down
else up
This process is important to accident analysis since helps to document formally the rela
tionship between informal accounts
Similarly we can provide state functions which can mimic actions particularly catas
trophic actions which are present in one account but not the other For example relative
to a parameter w of type WorkStatus
demineralizer statusw

 if w  working
then faulty
which allows a possible failure of the demineralizer given in the Fremlin account to be
resolved within the Bignell and Fortune account This is important since in the unifying
development S we have to include the uncertainty of whether the accident was caused
by the failure of the demineralizer or by a failure in the airsupply circuit Indeed in the










represents the catastrophic actions of the Bignell account and Cat
F
those of
Fremlin Note that we are forming the conjunction of the two sets of catastrophic actions 
eectively we are saying that both must occur in the accident scenario of our unifying
account

We need also to compose actions of the two accounts to form new actions in S
The development of these state functions is necessary to establish the fact that the











it is necessary using the deduction system of TLA and the aforementioned state functions
to establish that
 The initial conditions of S
h
F
follow from the initial conditions of S




 Fairness conditions are preserved
Internal consistency Once we have developed S we need to establish its internal con
sistency relative to a set of axioms The set  of assumptions on which internal consistency
should be based consists of the basic axioms about the working of the plant and thus is
essentially a union of the full types of all the state functions that are possible within S
For example an operation which simply opens an airvalve at the plant should not it is
hoped cause the control rods to be lowered into the core Thus we should have 
valve opening  control rods  down
Of course it is infeasible to rule out every eventuality so typically the Unchanged
predicate is used instead to indicate that each operation only has a limited eect For each
of S therefore it is necessary to prove internal consistency that each of the axioms of 
can be satised
 Pragmatics
Our novel application of formal methods and Lamports TLA in particular raises a num
ber of pragmatic questions For example we have not demonstrated that our approach
can be used to guide the detailed generation of accident reports Our focus has been on
the analytical comparison of existing documents We do however believe that these tech
niques can be of constructive use during the reporting process For example mathematical
models are already used to analyse and simulate the physical behaviour of materials during
major accidents The Air Accident Investigation Branch used analytical models to draft
its conclusions on the engine failure and passenger injuries in the Kegworth report 
Our novel application of mathematical specication techniques might be used in a similar
manner We have shown that an abstract notation can be used to represent and reason
about the normal R and abnormal Cat events that lead to system failure It seems
reasonable to expect that discrete mathematicians might use these models in much the
same way that accident analysts currently use continuous models of physical processes

A related question to whether these techniques can be used constructively is how can
the ndings of our analysis be communicated to nonformalists Formal descriptions in
TLA will have little meaning for many of the lawyers forensic scientists meteorologists
etc who contribute to accident investigations The communication of our formal models
is a subject for ongoing research 
 It should be noted however that a number of
researchers have developed temporal logic simulation tools  These can be used to
directly derive executable models from the descriptions presented in this paper It is
hypothesised that these techniques will provide direct parallels to simulation tools that
currently support the continuous models mentioned above
 Conclusions and Future Work
	  Summary of the above work
We have demonstrated how the idea of crossviewpoint consistency checking which has
been developed for software engineering may be fruitfully applied to accident reports In
particular we have shown how the technique may be applied when formalising accounts
using the temporal logic of actions We have prescribed how consistency checking between
two views can be carried out and have demonstrated its use with two separate accounts of
the Three Mile Island nuclear accident
	 Future work
 Expanding the TLA model
In the above formal representations of the accident accounts we have ignored realtime
as in the Three Mile Island accident starting at 	am and the emergency core coolant
system starting up two minutes later and the knowledge!beliefs!feelings of the operators
Indeed we have treated the actions of the latter as automatic responses to the accident
rather than based upon decisions resulting from the assimilation of knowledge
In some cases it may prove benecial to incorporate such realtime and epistemic
properties into our accident analysis We believe that the Temporal Logic of Actions
provides a useful framework for integrating such additional factors In our formalisation
above we have treated the accident as a closed system where the events of the accident
were unaected by any outside events Abadi and Lamport have shown how realtime
considerations can be incorporated into TLA  by modelling time as part of an external
environment We propose that in addition to or separately from this the epistemics of
operators can be integrated within the TLA specication of the accident We have been
using epistemic logic to model the beliefs of operators 	 and propose to incorporate such
ideas within an overall framework for the formalisation of accident analysis In particular
we intend to adapt Abadi and Lamports ideas for incorporating realtime within TLA to
do the same for an environment of operator beliefs

 Other FDTs
In the above we have concentrated upon consistency checking between dierent views
which are represented within one Formal Description Technique FDT the temporal logic
of actions Whilst we believe as remarked above that TLA is an extremely versatile and
appropriate tool for accident analysis it is conceivable that other FDTs will be used to
describe formally disaster scenarios For instance LOTOS has been used to describe the
mistakes made with the editing interface to the Therac
 machine 
 Dierent view
points of an accident may lead naturally to dierent techniques being used as is the case
with software engineering projects where for instance ve dierent types of viewpoint
are presented by the RMODP model 
  enterprise information computational en
gineering and technology We believe that TLA can be used to capture the information
and computational viewpoints and we have outlined above how we think that some human
factors elements the enterprise viewpoint can be integrated within the TLA structure
However since other FDTs may be appropriate in some cases it will be necessary to pro
duce mappings between dierent formalisms in order to show consistency between accident
perspectives A discussion of the use of dierent FDTs in the ODP model is given in 

In future work therefore we intend to show how viewpoints of accidents using dierent
FDTs may be unied A possible problem here is the wide range of dierent considerations
that are present within accident analysis which may not be so apparent within software
engineering projects  it is unclear which FDTs may be used and for what purpose Previ
ous research has investigated the applicability of various formal description techniques to
accident analysis   Another diculty is that we have to nd a common semantics
into which to map each FDT 
 Safety cases
We believe that formalised crossviewpoint consistency checking can be usefully employed
in the safety cases regime recommended for oshore oil or gas platforms by Lord Cullens
report into the Piper Alpha disaster  The notion of a safety case is that each oshore
installation lists every possible source of operational error and hazard and the actions
that would consequently be taken to cover any resulting emergency Consequently each
platform should have a safety procedure for every conceivable fault that could occur For
malisation and crossviewpoint checking of safety cases would help make more rigorous the
oshore safety regime and avoid deciencies including omissions and failures of compre
hension such as those highlighted in a recent television documentary 
	 Concluding remarks
We believe that the techniques that we have described will become a useful tool in fu
ture accident reporting in order to ensure that interpretations by dierent analysts are
compatible and that the ndings of accident inquiries are disseminated correctly to other
parties The complexity and dynamic nature of many systems is such that the approach

we have described should make reports easier to verify with regard to the basic ndings of
an accident inquiry The formal establishment of crossviewpoint consistency between sep
arate parts of a report will be necessary we believe in order to structure accident inquiry
ndings successfully
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A Formalisation details
In this appendix we present details of the formalisation of the accounts which we have elided
in the main body of the paper We believe that it is useful to give a complete presentation of
the formalisation of accident reports in order to illustrate fully the structure of a formalised
accident analysis system and how the ideas that have been given work in practice For
ease of reference we give the information in tabular form
A  Actions in Fremlins account
In Table  informal descriptions of actions taken from Fremlins account were given
The associated causal event formulas are spread over Tables 
 For each causal
property which we expect to be able to derive from our detailed formalisation we give its
justication by referring to Fremlins text In each case an action A in a causal formula is
shorthand for EnabledA This is done in the interests of space
The formal denitions of the actions in Fremlins account are given in Tables 
A Details of the Bignell and Fortune Account
A description of the formalisation of Bignell and Fortunes account 	 of the Three Mile
Island accident is given in 	 For the sake of completeness we shall present the formal
isation details of that account here
Table  gives the informal description of the actions in the account whilst Tables 

 give the causal event formulas which are implied by Bignell and Fortunes report The
formal denitions of the actions are given in Tables 
 Finally we present the Init and
Cat components of the formalisation in Table 

Formula Justication for formula
DMF  ASV  MFS
Quote
At about 
AM the main feedwater system
malfunctioned apparently as a result of fail
ure either of the demineraliser or of the air
supply to an airoperated valve
MFS AFE  AFS
Quote
With the main feedwater supply system out
of operation the auxiliary system was to
have started automatically It did not how
ever because a number of manual valves in
the auxiliary system had inadvertently been
left closed after a test of the system in the
days prior to the accident
MVC  AFE
This models the fact that as mentioned in the quote
above if some manual valves were closed MVC then the
auxiliary feedwater system must not have been enabled
MFS  AFS  SGD
This formula which says that if neither feedwater system
is operational then the steam generators will eventually
dry out is justied by the following quote
Without feedwater supply the steam gener
ators dried out   
SGD  PCE
This comes from the continuation of the above quote
  resulting in a rise in the primary coolant
temperature and pressure
Table   Causal event formulas in Fremlins account part 

Formula Justication for formula
PCP  CRS CTS
Quote
The rise in pressure automatically shut down
the reactor stopping the chain reaction but
the intensely radioactive core continued to
give out heat
CTS  PCP  RVO
Quote
Within seconds the pressure of water rose
enough to trigger the opening of a relief
valve
RVO  RVF  CWR
Quote
This valve stuck in the open position provid
ing a continuous release of radioactive feed
ing water from the main steel pressure vessel
into a quench tank
PCE  ECS
Quote
The emergency corecooling system started
automatically at two minutes into the acci
dent sequence and began to raise the coolant
level
Table   Causal event formulas in Fremlins account part 


Formula Justication for formula
CWR  ECS  
PWL  PPL
We glean from the above quote also that the primary
circuit waterlevel must also have been low PWL due
to the valve being open From the quote below we also




Within a few minutes the level indicator for
the pressuriser misbehaved and went o scale
on the high side when actually the pressure
was too low





rode rst one of the two emergency core
cooling water injection pumps and in a few
minutes the other believing that already
too much water had been fed in
a
Note that we are treating the operators as automatons
and are not considering the range of options at their disposal
we mention in the conclusion how belief systems may be for
malised by epistemic logics and we discuss how they may be
integrated within our TLA framework
ECS  PLH  LOCA
This says that an LOCA occurred as a result of the emer
gency cooling being shuto and the pressure being low
We dene the LOCA as consisting of zero water level and
pressure The formula is derived from the following quote
Within two minutes of the emergency cool
ing shuto it appears that at the reduced
pressure water in the pressure vessel began
to boil into steam lowering the waterlevel
Table 








 Unchanged Varnfauxiliary valvesg
AFS
auxiliary feedwater  o secondary ow  low






 air supply status  working
 air supply status
 
 faulty
 Unchanged Varnfair supply statusg
CRS




 Unchanged Varnfcore reactiong
CTS
core reaction  o
 water temp  normal




water runo  true
DMF




 Unchanged Varnfdemineralizer statusg
LOCA
 primary ow  none
 water press  low
MFS
feedwater line  online
PIF
 pressure indicator status  working
 pressure indicator status
 
 faulty




 water press  high




 Unchanged Varnfpressure indicationg
RVF
 relief valve status
 
 faulty
 Unchanged Varnfrelief valve statusg
RVO
 relief valve  closed relief valve
 
 open
 Unchanged Varnfrelief valveg
SGD




 Unchanged Varnfsecondary owg
Table   Actions of the Fremlin account and their formal denitions in TLA Part 

Action Description
CRD The control rods dropping into the reactor core Note that this did not stop
all heat generation in the core
CTS The continued transmission of heat from the core to the primary circuit after
shutdown
CWR Refers to the continuous runo of water into the quench tank
EVC The fact that the emergency feedwater line valves were closed
FSD The feedwater line to the steam generator being closed
HPE Indicates that the high pressure pumps were enabled
PCD The action of the pumps closing down
PCE Represents the emergency conditions of rising temperature and pressure which




which represents the conjunction of the temperature PCT and PCP pressure
rise
PLP Denotes a loss of pressure in the primary circuit
RVF Indicates that the relief valve was faulty
SBD The steam generators boiling dry
STS The shutdown of the steam turbine
VSO The valves switching o in the air circuit
WAC Denotes water being introduced into the air circuit
WRO Water runo into the drain tank from the primary circuit
Table   Actions and their informal descriptions for the Bignell and Fortune account

Formula Justication for formula
WAC  VSO
The above is derived from page  of 
 where it is said
  they the maintenance crew allowed some
water to enter an air circuit that opened and
closed some valves   The aected valves
shut o   
VSO  PCD
Continuing with the quote above
The aected valves shut o and the pumps




One of the pumping circuits aected by the
valves switching o was the feedwater line to
the steam generator in the secondary circuit
FSD  STS EPS
The above was deduced from the quotes below
  so the safety system shut down the steam
turbine and the electric power generator it
drove Page   When the pumps supplying
water to the steam generator stopped three
emergency pumps for the feedwater started
Page  




  an operator   noticed that these pumps
were running but he did not notice two par
ticular warning lights on a control panel
They signalled that valves were closed on
each of the two emergency feedwater lines
and so were preventing water from reaching
the steam generators which soon boiled dry
  Not until almost eight minutes later did
the operators notice the closed valves and
open them
Table   Causal event formulas in Bignell  Fortunes account part 
	
Formula Justication for formula
SBD  PCE
Quote
Deprived of an outlet for the heat still en
tering from the reactor core the water in the
primary circuit increased in temperature and
pressure
PCE  CRD  RVO
Quote
A relief valve on top of the pressuriser opened
and steam and water began to ow out to a
drain tank   To reduce the production of
heat in the reactor core the control rods au
tomatically descended into it   
RVO WRO
This also comes from the quote above
CRD WRO  PCE
This says that the lowering of the control rods in con
junction with the water runo into the drain tank led to
an end to the heattemperature emergency in the pri
mary circuit This comes from the following on page 
of Bignell and Fortune
The combined eects of lowering the control
rods and opening the relief valve brought the
temperature in the vessel down to normal   
Table 	  Causal event formulas in Bignell and Fortunes account part 


Formula Justication for formula
RVF 
PCEWRO  RVO
The above is a formalisation of the idea that provided
that the relief valve is not faulty then it will be closed
if both water runo is taking place and there is not a
pressureheat emergency in the primary circuit This
comes from the sequel to the quote above
  at which time the relief valve should have
closed
PCE WRO  PLP
The above says that if there is no pressure emergency in
the primary circuit then water runo will lead to a loss




Through this valve more than one third of
the contents of the primary circuit escaped
  two high pressure pumps started auto
matically triggered by a lowering of pressure
in the primary circuit
HPE PLP  HPP
This is justied by the second of the quoted lines given
above
PLP  LDO  LOCA
This says that a loss of pressure in the primary circuit
together with opening the letdown valve led to the Loss
of Coolant Accident event It comes from the following
The letdown valve was opened to release
what was believed to be an excess of water
The original fall in pressure and the failure
of the injection to bring down the tempera
ture should have alerted the operators that
LOCA was underway but it did not
Table 




water runo  true
CTS
core reaction  o
 water temp  normal
CWR
water runo  true
EVC
 feedwater line  open  feedwater line
 
 closed
 Unchanged Varnffeedwater lineg
FSD
 feedwater line  open  feedwater line
 
 closed
 Unchanged Varnffeedwater lineg





 hpp enabled  oine  hpp enabled
 
 online
 Unchanged Varnfhpp enabledg
PCD
 ac pumps  on  ac valves  closed ac pumps
 
 o




 high  water press
 
 high




 low  Unchanged Varnfwater pressg
RVF
 relief valve status
 
 faulty
 Unchanged Varnfrelief valve statusg






 feedwater line  closed
 e pumps  o
 e pumps  on  e valves  closed secondary ow
 
 low
 Unchanged Varnfsecondary owg
STS




 Unchanged Varnfsteam turbineg
VSO
 ac valves  open  ac valves
 
 closed
 Unchanged Varnfac valvesg
WAC
 air circuit status  clear air circuit status
 
 water lled
 Unchanged Varnfair circuit statusg
WRO
 water runo  false  water runo
 
 true
 Unchanged Varnwater runo
Table 





 relief valve  closed primary ow  normal
 steam turbine  on  e pumps status  online
 e pumps  o  air circuit status  clear
 secondary ow  normal  ac valves  open
 control rods  up  ac pumps  on
 water runo  false  water temp  normal
 water press  normal  feedwater line  open
 relief valve status  working hpp enabled  online
 letdown valve  closed  high pressure pumps  o
Cat
WAC  LDO  ESO  RVF  EVC
Table   Toplevel actions of the Bignell and Fortune account
	
